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Abstract
While dismissing a coach is one of the key decisions made by football club boards,
this decision is challenging because poor performance tends to coincide with both
bad luck and low coaching ability. Our paper is the first to differentiate between
coach dismissals following actual poor performance on the pitch (wise dismissals)
and coach dismissals following seemingly poor performance due to bad luck (un-
wise dismissals). To categorize dismissals, we use "expected goals", which are less
vulnerable to random variation in match outcomes. Using match-level data from
the big five European football leagues, we find that wise dismissals increase subse-
quent performance compared to a control group of non-dismissals with similarly poor
performance on the pitch. However, unwise dismissals do not improve subsequent
performance compared to a control group of non-dismissals with similar strings of
bad luck. Our results have important implications for the design of future coach
dismissal studies and for football clubs to reduce ineffective dismissal decisions.
JEL Classification: D81, J44, L83
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Flepp, R. and Franck, E. (2020).
The performance effects of wise and unwise managerial dismissals. Economic Inquiry,
which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12924. This
article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and
Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
∗Corresponding author. Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail:
raphael.flepp@business.uzh.ch
∗∗Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail: egon.franck@business.uzh.ch
1 Introduction
Understanding how managerial change affects the performance of organizations is of crit-
ical importance. One main area of previous research is the sports industry, where the
focus is on the impact of head coach changes on team performance (Giambatista, Rowe,
& Riaz, 2005). Coaches are ultimately responsible for team performance and thus hold
official authority (Grusky, 1963). Based on the considerable influence of coaches on teams
through strategic, operational and motivational channels, research suggests that coaches
play crucial roles in determining team performance (e.g., Rowe, Cannella Jr, Rankin, &
Gorman, 2005; Muehlheusser, Schneemann, Sliwka, & Wallmeier, 2018; Kattuman, Loch,
& Kurchian, 2019).
However, most empirical studies across different sports conclude that there is no pos-
itive effect of involuntary coach changes on team performance (e.g., Gamson & Scotch,
1964; Audas, Goddard, & Rowe, 2006). Most prominently, studies using data from Euro-
pean football show that while performance improves after a within-season coach dismissal,
performance also improves for a control group of counterfactual dismissals that did not
occur (e.g., De Paola & Scoppa, 2012; van Ours & van Tuijl, 2016). Thus, even though
within-season dismissals occur frequently and usually attract considerable media atten-
tion, they do not seem to cause improved team performance; rather, mean reversion drives
subsequent performance improvements.
One potential explanation for this puzzling finding is that football club boards make
dismissal decisions based on misperceptions. While dismissing a coach is one of the key
decisions made by football club boards, this decision is challenging because poor perfor-
mance tends to coincide with bad luck and low manager ability (Huson, Malatesta, &
Parrino, 2004). Thus, boards may falsely infer manager ability from exogenous perfor-
mance components, which could disguise any positive replacement effect. Indeed, Kaplan
and Minton (2012) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) show that even professional corporate
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boards fail to filter out exogenous elements, and top managers are dismissed after poor
firm performance caused by factors beyond their control.
These misperceptions are likely to be amplified for the boards of football clubs. Because
football is a low-scoring sport, the random component in a single game is considerable.
Anderson and Sally (2014, p. 40) even argue that “in fact [the role of chance] is about
50/50. Half of the goals you see, half of the results you experience, are down not to skill
and ability but to random chance and luck.” Several studies have shown that decision
makers underestimate the role of randomness in match outcomes and assign too much
weight to the observed outcomes when they evaluate performance, a phenomenon that is
commonly referred to as outcome bias (e.g., Lefgren, Platt, & Price, 2015; Gauriot & Page,
2019). Consequently, the dismissal decisions of football club boards are likely based on
misperceptions when exogenous factors shape match outcomes (Brechot & Flepp, 2020).
In such cases, club boards may systematically attribute bad luck to poor coach quality.
This paper is the first to account for boards’ misperceptions when dismissing coaches
by differentiating between coach dismissals following actual poor performance on the pitch
(wise dismissals) and coach dismissals following seemingly poor performance due to bad
luck (unwise dismissals). If head coaches matter and replacing a bad coach with a more
skilled one has an actual impact, after wise dismissals, we would expect team performance
to improve compared to that of a control group of teams with similarly poor performance
on the pitch but for which there was no dismissal. After unwise dismissals, however, we
do not expect team performance to improve compared to that of a control group of non-
dismissal teams that faced similar bad luck, as performance reverts to the mean in both
groups.
We use match-level data from the English Premier League, the French Ligue 1, the
German Bundesliga, the Italian Serie A and the Spanish La Liga for the five seasons from
2013/2014 to 2017/2018. During this sample period, we registered 143 involuntary in-
season coach dismissals. To differentiate between wise and unwise dismissals, we compare
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the ranking of teams in the official league table to the ranking of teams based on "expected
goals" at the time of the dismissal. Following Brechot and Flepp (2020), we derive the
expected goals (xG) for a match by summing up the estimated scoring probability for
each shot.1 For example, if a team took five shots in a match with estimated scoring
probabilities of 0.05, 0.10, 0.10, 0.60, and 0.90, the number of expected goals equals 1.75.
Because shots occur much more frequently than goals, xG is a performance evaluation
measure that is less prone to randomness. Indeed, Brechot and Flepp (2020) show that
the xG metric reflects true performance on the pitch more accurately than does the match
outcome. Consequently, a ranking based on xG should reflect a team’s playing quality on
the pitch better than its official league ranking because the latter is fully subject to the
random component of match outcomes.
In our main specification, we classify a dismissal as wise if the rank based on xG is
equal to or worse than the rank in the official league table. In such situations, teams fall
short of expectations due to poor performance on the pitch, and replacement of the coach
appears justified. If the rank based on xG is better than the rank in the league table,
we classify the dismissal as unwise because the team likely performed below expectations
due to bad luck. Conversely, we classify all potential non-dismissals, i.e., all observations
of teams without dismissals during a particular season, as wise if the rank based on xG is
equal to or worse than the rank in the official league table, and as unwise otherwise.2
To account for biased club board decisions and mean reversion effects, we compare
dismissals after poor performance on the pitch to non-dismissals after poor performance
on the pitch (i.e., wise dismissals vs. unwise non-dismissals) and dismissals after bad luck
to non-dismissals after bad luck (i.e., unwise dismissals vs. wise non-dismissals). Building
upon the methods of van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we match wise dismissals to unwise
non-dismissals and unwise dismissals to wise non-dismissals based on the same team and a
similar "cumulative surprise", i.e., the sum of the difference between the number of actual
1 In Section 3.2, we explain the estimation of shot probabilities in detail.
2 Our results are robust to alternative cutoffs for wise and unwise dismissals (see Section 4.2).
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points and the expected points derived from betting odds. Thus, each control group
performed similarly below expectations due to either poor performance on the pitch or a
string of bad luck.
Using a team-season fixed effects regression model, we find that team performance
significantly increases after wise dismissals but not after unwise non-dismissals. In par-
ticular, the F-test for equality of parameters is rejected, which implies that replacing a
coach has a positive effect if the team performed below expectations due to poor playing
on the pitch. By contrast, we find that team performance similarly increases after both
unwise dismissals and wise non-dismissals. Thus, in situations where a team performed
below expectations due to bad luck, team performance reverts to the mean regardless of
whether the coach is dismissed. Furthermore, employing a matching method that omits
the requirement that each dismissal must be matched to a non-dismissal of the same team
leads to the same results.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on the effects of coach changes
on team performance. First, we account for club boards’ biased decision making and
show that post-dismissal performance critically depends on the situation preceding the
dismissal decision. Replacement of a coach is beneficial only if poor performance on the
pitch was indeed the driver of below expectation performance. If, however, a replacement
decision was triggered when a string of bad luck was the main cause of performing be-
low expectations, the replacement of the coach has no effect on subsequent performance.
While Brechot and Flepp (2020) discuss a few examples wherein teams were ranked very
differently by the official league table than by expected goals, we systematically focus on
subsequent performance effects of wise and unwise (non-)dismissals. Second, our results
explain why many previous studies failed to find causal performance improvements after
coach dismissals. Considering that a substantial fraction of club boards’ dismissal deci-
sions are unwise, the average post-performance effect of a coach dismissal is biased toward
zero due to the effect of mean reversion. Thus, we advance the insights of van Ours and
4
van Tuijl (2016) by applying their methods in light of comparability but critically ac-
counting for biased club boards’ dismissal decisions. Finally, the disclosure of suboptimal
coach dismissal decisions that trigger financial consequences without performance effects
is complex. Because post-dismissal performance also improves after unwise dismissals,
boards may view their decisions as justified even though the same result could have been
achieved without replacing the coach. Thus, football clubs should complement their coach
evaluation strategies with more analytical approaches to reduce ineffective decisions. Re-
placing a head coach is expensive, and the costs associated with unwise dismissals could
be better invested in new players to improve the strength of the team.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review the
literature and derive the hypotheses. In Section 3, we present our empirical methods. In
Section 4, we present the results and in Section 5, we conclude.
2 Related literature and hypotheses
The question of whether coaches matter for team performance has been addressed by
several studies. In a comprehensive study, Berry and Fowler (2019) find that coaches
matter in Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association (NBA), the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL), and the National Football League (NFL), as well as in
college football and college basketball. Specifically, their results imply that coaches ex-
plain approximately 20-30% of the variation in a team’s performance, depending on the
sport and the performance outcomes used. Furthermore, Muehlheusser et al. (2018) an-
alyze the impact of football coaches in the German Bundesliga. The authors find that
coaches have a significant impact on team performance and that there is considerable
ability heterogeneity among coaches. Moreover, Muehlheusser et al. (2018) show that
coaches have a significant effect on teams’ playing styles, for example, by employing more
offensive or defensive players.
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Kattuman et al. (2019) present a conceptual framework of how a football coach can
influence a team and its performance. As inputs, the coach selects the talent on the field
and sets the game strategy. Furthermore, he or she can drive motivation through his or her
leadership and feedback style. These inputs potentially enhance team processes regarding
physical aspects of training sessions, such as shooting or fitness, and motivational aspects,
such as team cohesion, communication or emergent team states. Consequently, the coach
is responsible for team development and nurturing talent (Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi, &
Guermat, 2010; Pieper, Nüesch, & Franck, 2014). The chosen tactics, e.g., the speed of
play or the system of positions, and the fielded players, in turn, influence game behavior.
Finally, the combination of inputs and team processes influences the affect and effort level
in the game, which ultimately translates into better team performance (Kattuman et al.,
2019).
Based on the considerable influence of the head coach on the team, research on coach
changes in professional football conjectures that coaches play a crucial role in determining
team performance (e.g., Koning, 2003; Bryson, Buraimo, & Simmons, 2018; De Paola &
Scoppa, 2012). Consequently, if coaches matter and a team performs poorly, replacing
an ineffective coach with an effective one should improve team performance (van Ours &
van Tuijl, 2016). In this context, the literature has acknowledged that poor performance
tends to coincide with bad luck and low manager ability (Huson et al., 2004). Thus, an
improvement in subsequent performance could be due either to the ability of the new
coach or to mean reversion. To account for this possibility, it is crucial to compare actual
dismissals to a control group of non-dismissals with similarly poor prior performance
(Giambatista et al., 2005).
De Paola and Scoppa (2012) employed nearest neighbor matching based on the ranking
difference, the number of points obtained in the four most recent matches and the period
in a particular season to find a counterfactual dismissal for each actual dismissal. Using
12 seasons from the Italian Serie A between 1997/98 and 2008/09, De Paola and Scoppa
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(2012) find that improved team performance is due solely to mean reversion; thus, a coach
change does not causally affect team performance. This finding is in line with those of
several other studies using control groups of counterfactual dismissals (e.g., Balduck, Bue-
lens, & Philippaerts, 2010; Heuer, Müller, Rubner, Hagemann, & Strauss, 2011; Ter Weel,
2011).
More recently, van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) formed a control group by matching a
team to itself based on cumulative surprise, which measures how far below expectations
the team performs and is calculated as the sum of the difference between the number of
actual points and the expected points derived from betting odds. Using 36 dismissals
and 33 counterfactual dismissals from the Dutch Eredivisie in the 14 seasons between
2000/01 and 2013/14, the authors find that forced coach replacements do not improve
team performance. Besters, van Ours, and van Tuijl (2016) replicate the methods of
van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) using 45 dismissals and 34 counterfactual dismissals from
the English Premier League between 2000/01 and 2014/15. Similarly, they conclude
that, on average, performance does not improve following a coach’s dismissal and that
a successful coach change remains highly unpredictable. Overall, most empirical evidence
from professional football shows that coach dismissals have no causal effect on subsequent
team performance.3
However, the role of football club boards’ misperceptions when replacing a coach has
been neglected in the literature. If the coach evaluations of club boards are partly driven
by irrelevant cues such as unlucky losses (Arnulf, Mathisen, & Hærem, 2012), it is likely
that club boards systematically attribute bad luck to poor coach quality when making
dismissal decisions. Thus, to properly test whether a coach’s dismissal is beneficial for
a football club, we differentiate between dismissals and non-dismissals that occur due to
either poor performance on the pitch or simply bad luck. We refer to a dismissal as wise
3 There exist, however, some exceptions. For example, Madum (2016) finds a positive performance effect but only for home
games; Muehlheusser, Schneemann, and Sliwka (2016) find that dismissals enhance the performance of homogeneous
teams but not of heterogeneous teams; and Bryson et al. (2018) find a positive performance effect after dismissals but no
effect after voluntary quits.
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if a team performed below expectations due to poor performance on the pitch and as
unwise if a team performed below expectations due to bad luck. Conversely, we refer to a
counterfactual non-dismissal as wise if a team performed below expectations due to bad
luck and as unwise if a team performed below expectations due to poor performance on the
pitch. Table 1 illustrates this theoretical decomposition of dismissals and non-dismissals.
Table 1
Theoretical decomposition of dismissals and non-dismissals.
dismissal non-dismissal
wise Below expectations due to poor
performance on the pitch
Below expectations due to bad
luck
unwise Below expectations due to bad
luck
Below expectations due to poor
performance on the pitch
To gain insight from this decomposition, dismissals after poor performance on the pitch
must be compared to non-dismissals after poor performance on the pitch, and dismissals
after bad luck must be compared to non-dismissals after bad luck. We expect that a
dismissal benefits a team if a coach whose team played poorly on the pitch is replaced.
Thus, we formulate the first hypothesis as follows:
H1. Wise dismissals improve performance relative to a control group with similarly poor
performance on the pitch but no dismissal (i.e., unwise non-dismissals).
We expect performance following an unwise dismissal to improve in a manner simi-
lar to that following a wise non-dismissal because of simple mean reversion. Thus, we
hypothesize the following:
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H2. Unwise dismissals do not improve performance relative to a control group with
similarly bad luck but no dismissal (i.e., wise non-dismissals).
In the next section, we present our methods, outline how we classify dismissals as either




We employ data from the English Premier League, the French Ligue 1, the German
Bundesliga, the Italian Serie A and the Spanish La Liga for the five seasons from 2013/2014
to 2017/2018. Our main data set contains 9,130 matches for which we collected the date,
the teams, the final score, and the head coach of each team from www.transfermarkt.com
and www.football-data.co.uk. For every in-season coach change, we recorded whether it
was a dismissal or a voluntary quit. Following Pieper et al. (2014), we categorize a coach
change as a dismissal if the club’s board unilaterally terminated the employment and
categorize a coach change as voluntary quit if the coach unilaterally resigned or if the
termination was with mutual consent.4 As in van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we ignore
coach dismissals in the first four and the last four match weeks because we aim to estimate
the difference in team performance before and after a dismissal. Further, following Besters
et al. (2016), we consider only the first coach dismissal in a season.
As a result, we registered 143 coach dismissals during our sample period. The data
were then complemented by the betting odds for each match and the final rank of each
club in the previous season.5 Additionally, we employ a second data set consisting of
4 Our results do not change if we reclassify the terminations explained as "by mutual consent" as dismissals instead of
voluntary quits.
5 We downloaded the betting odds from www.football-data.co.uk. As in van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), our bookmaker
data are mainly from William Hill (99.96%) and supplemented by Ladbrokes (0.04%). The final rank in the previous
season for promoted teams is set to 20 (18 for the German Bundesliga).
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all 214,194 shots taken during the 9,130 matches included in our sample to estimate the
expected goals performance metric.6
3.2 Categorization of (non-)dismissals using expected goals
Football is a low-scoring game, and a team might unexpectedly lose or tie a game despite
playing well. To differentiate situations in which teams performed below expectations
due to poor performance on the pitch from situations in which teams performed below
expectations due to a string of bad luck, we need a measure of performance that is less
prone to random variation.
We draw on the concept of expected goals (xG) based on quantified scoring chances.
Scoring chances are the second-to-last step in the goal production process, and all teams
try to create valuable chances to score goals. Following Brechot and Flepp (2020), we
employ shots as scoring chances and estimate their scoring probability. In our sample,
we observe a total of 214,194 shots that translated into 24,082 goals scored.7 Thus, the
average number of shots in a match is approximately 23.5, whereas the average number of
goals is approximately 2.7. Because shots occur much more often than goals, the expected
goal metric is less vulnerable to the randomness associated with actual goals and match
results.
To test the superior informativeness of the xG metric, Brechot and Flepp (2020) exam-
ine how well past match outcomes and past expected goal performance explain the future
success of teams. In particular, they regress the future number of points won separately
on the past number of points won and on the past expected goal difference and compare
the resulting R2 values. Using different combinations of the number of previous matches
and the number of following matches, Brechot and Flepp (2020) show that R2 is higher
when the xG metric is used. For example, when the ten previous matches are used to
6 The shot data are provided by Nielsen, a measurement and data analytics company. The data for the seasons from
2013/2014 to 2015/2016 are the same as those used in Brechot and Flepp (2020).
7 Own goals are excluded because they are unintended.
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predict the following ten matches, the past number of points won explains 25.3% of the
variation in future points, whereas the past expected goal difference explains 32%. Thus,
the xG metric increases R2 by 6.7 percentage points (or 26.5%). Overall, Brechot and
Flepp (2020) conclude that the xG metric, even though it is based on a simple model used
to estimate the scoring probability of a shot, reflects true performance on the pitch more
accurately than does the match outcome.
We estimate the scoring probability of an individual shot by running a logistic regres-
sion model where the binary response variable indicates whether or not the shot translated
into a goal. As explanatory variables, we include the distance to the goal, the angle to
the goal, the rule setting (i.e., open play, free kick or penalty kick), and the body part
used for each shot. As Brechot and Flepp (2020) emphasize, the estimated scoring prob-
abilities are likely to be biased if goal scoring or goal conceding qualities of teams are not
fully captured by the model. To mitigate this bias, we include team-season and opposing
team-season fixed effects in addition to the model developed by Brechot and Flepp (2020).
These fixed effects account for time-constant heterogeneity in team quality characteristics,
such as offensive and defensive skills within a particular season. In Appendix A, we pro-
vide more detailed variable descriptions, present descriptive statistics, outline the logistic
regression model, and show the estimated model parameters. Based on these parameters,
we predict the scoring probabilities and aggregate them for each team within a match to
derive the number of expected goals scored per match. For example, if a team took three
shots in a match with estimated scoring probabilities of 0.70, 0.15, and 0.05, the expected
goals scored are equal to 0.90.
The expected goal metric allows us to determine which team on the pitch is better at
creating valuable scoring chances. Instead of awarding the number of points based on the
actual goals scored in a match, i.e., three for a win, one for a draw and zero for a loss,
we award points based on expected goals. A team wins the match and is awarded three
points based on expected goals if the expected goal difference is larger than 0.5. If the
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expected goal difference is between -0.5 and 0.5, the match ends in a draw, and each team
receives one point. Otherwise, the team loses the match based on expected goals, and no
points are awarded.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics and correlations for outcome-based performance
measures and expected goal-based performance measures for the 5,326 team-matches
played by teams for which one of the 143 dismissals occurred in a particular season.8
On average, the number of goals scored and the goal difference are very similar to the
number of expected goals scored and the expected goals difference. However, the standard
deviations of the latter two are considerably lower. The average number of points won
is 1.11, whereas the number of points based on expected goals is 1.00. The correlation
between these two measures is 0.45, which seems reasonable given the premise that a
considerable fraction of match outcomes and, thus, the number of actual points are driven
by luck. Using the number of points based on expected goals should, at least partly, filter
out the random component of lucky and unlucky match outcomes.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Goals scored 1.11 1.11 0 10
2 Goal diff -0.42 1.81 -8 8 0.67
3 Win 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.61 0.74
4 Points 1.11 1.26 0 3 0.63 0.84 0.95
5 xG scored 1.11 0.74 0 7.77 0.56 0.42 0.34 0.36
6 xG diff -0.41 1.30 -6.94 7.11 0.39 0.60 0.41 0.47 0.69
7 Points based on xG 1.00 1.15 0 3 0.38 0.50 0.41 0.45 0.67 0.81
Notes: N = 5,326 team-matches played by teams where one of the 143 dismissals occurred in a particular season.
To identify situations where match outcomes misrepresent performance on the pitch,
we rank teams by points assigned based on expected goals and construct an xG league
table. The rank in the xG table should reflect a team’s performance on the pitch more
accurately than the rank in the official league table (OLT) because the OLT draws solely
on actual match outcomes, where bad luck directly translates into fewer points and a
lower rank. For example, a team could play well on the pitch and win a match in terms of
8 A team-match refers to a match from the perspective of the focal team.
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expected goals because that team created more valuable scoring chances than its opponent.
However, that team might actually lose the match if scoring chances did not translate into
goals. In such situations, the xG table rank should be better than the OLT rank. In other
situations where a team played poorly, the xG table rank should be equal to or worse than
the OLT rank. Building upon Brechot and Flepp (2020), we plot the OLT rank against
the xG table rank, which is useful for visualizing situations in which randomness likely
played a considerable role in match outcomes. Figure 1 shows the rank combinations of
all 143 dismissals at the time the dismissal occurred.9 Notably, the correlation between
the two rankings is approximately 0.75.
Figure 1
Rank in the official league table vs. rank in the xG table at the time of coach dismissal. The identity line marks the cutoff
for wise and unwise dismissals.
9 Some dots represent multiple dismissals with the same rank combination.
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To categorize a dismissal as wise or unwise, we use the difference between the xG table
rank and the OLT rank. In our baseline analysis, we employ a rank difference of zero as
the cutoff value.10 Thus, we categorize a dismissal as wise if the rank based on xG is equal
to or worse than the rank based on the OLT. If the rank based on xG is better than the
rank based on the OLT, we categorize a dismissal as unwise. Such teams performed below
expectations due to bad luck because their xG-based ranking indicates higher quality play
on the pitch. The identity line in Figure 1 marks the cutoff for wise and unwise dismissals.
Dismissals above or on the line are categorized as wise, whereas dismissals below the line
are classified as unwise.
Conversely, we categorize all potential non-dismissal observations, i.e., all observations
that are not associated with a team-season wherein an actual dismissal occurred, as wise
if the ranking based on xG is equal to or better than the ranking based on the OLT, and
as unwise otherwise. This categorization of wise and unwise non-dismissals is needed to
construct an appropriate control group for wise and unwise actual dismissals.
3.3 Treatment and control group matching
Because dismissals are not exogenous, we aim to construct a control group of teams with-
out a dismissal but otherwise identical characteristics for both wise and unwise dismissals
to infer their causal effect on team performance. We build on the methods of van Ours
and van Tuijl (2016) to match wise and unwise dismissals (treatment groups) to wise and
unwise non-dismissals (control groups). In particular, we match wise dismissals to unwise
non-dismissals and unwise dismissals to wise non-dismissals based on the same team and
the closest cumulative surprise (CS) using the nearest neighbor approach. The CS mea-
sures deviations from expectations and is defined as the sum of the differences between
10 In the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.2, we test alternative rank difference cutoffs of -1, -2, and -3.
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the actual number of points won in a match and the expected number of points based on
betting odds.11
To qualify for inclusion in a control group, a non-dismissal must stem from the same
team but another season without a coach change, and the CS values must not differ by
more than 0.5.12 Matching based on the same team accounts for unobserved heterogeneity
among teams because some teams might be more likely than other teams to dismiss a
coach under similar circumstances (van Ours & van Tuijl, 2016). Further, this matching
controls for time-constant seasonal aspirations of teams, such as qualifying for the UEFA
Champions League or avoiding relegation. Moreover, matching counterfactual situations
based on CS ensures that the control team performed similarly below expectations without
dismissing the coach afterwards. Following this matching procedure, we were able to
match 41 dismissals to non-dismissals. Figure 2a displays the matched dismissals and
non-dismissals based on this restricted team matching procedure using the identity line
as the cutoff for wise and unwise (non-)dismissals.
As an alternative matching method, we follow De Paola and Scoppa (2012) and Bryson
et al. (2018) and omit the restriction that each dismissal has to be matched to a non-
dismissal of the same team.13 Thus, for every (un)wise dismissal, we match a correspond-
ing (un)wise non-dismissal using only the CS. Employing this procedure, we are able
to match all 143 dismissals to non-dismissals. Figure 2b shows the matched dismissals
and non-dismissals based on this unrestricted team matching procedure, again using the
identity line as the cutoff for wise and unwise (non-)dismissals.
11 The expected number of points is calculated as [(probability of win)·3] + [(probability of draw)·1]. The probabilities are
calculated as the reciprocal value of the corresponding betting odds and are adjusted for the bookmaker’s over-round.
For more detailed information, see van Ours and van Tuijl (2016). Note that the expected number of points differs
fundamentally from the number of points based on expected goals. The latter is based on actual performance on the
pitch after the game, whereas the former is based on expectations prior to the game.
12 As for actual dismissals, we ignore non-dismissals within the first four and last four matches within a season. Alternative
maximum CS differences of 0.25, 0.75 and 1.0 do not alter our main conclusions.
13 Furthermore, the control group employed by Heuer et al. (2011) can consist of any team that displays a similar goal
difference.
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(a) restricted team matching (b) unrestricted team matching
Figure 2
Matched dismissals and non-dismissals. Restricted team matching is based on the same team, whereas unrestricted team
matching allows for matching across different teams. The identity line marks the cutoff for wise and unwise (non-)dismissals.
3.4 Econometric specification
Building upon the approach of van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we estimate the regression
model outlined in Equation 1:
γijk = β1Wise dismissalijk + β2Unwise non-dismissalijk
+ β3Unwise dismissalijk + β4Wise non-dismissalijk
+ γ1Homeijk + γ2Rank opponentijk + ηjk + ǫijk
(1)
where i denotes the match, j indicates the team and k refers to the season. For the
dependent variable γijk, we employ the same performance measures as in van Ours and
van Tuijl (2016), namely, the number of points obtained in a match, a dummy variable
indicating whether a match was won (win) and the goal difference in a match (goal diff ).
The (non-)dismissal variables are dummy variables that indicate whether there was a
(non-)dismissal of the relevant type earlier in the season. We are mainly interested in
the difference between the coefficients β1 and β2 and between the coefficients β3 and β4.
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According to our hypotheses, we expect β1 to be significantly larger than β2 (H1) and β3
to be equal to β4 (H2).
To account for unobserved differences in team quality within a particular season, we
include team-season fixed effects ηjk. Furthermore, we control for home field advantage by
including the dummy variable Home and proxy the strength of the opponent by controlling
for the final rank of the opponent in the previous season (Rank opponent).
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Table 3 presents our main results for the four (non-)dismissal groups and the two matching
procedures.14 For the restricted team matching procedure, the number of observations is
2,854, including 1,522 matches from teams with a dismissal and 1,332 matches from teams
with a non-dismissal.15 Column (1) shows that after a wise dismissal, the number of points
per match is 0.23 higher than before the dismissal. By contrast, the effect for the relevant
control group of unwise non-dismissals is -0.10 points per match. The F-test for equality
shows that these parameters are significantly different (F = 7.30***). The findings for
Win and Goal diff, the performance measures in Columns (2) and (3), respectively, are
similar, as the F-tests are again rejected. Thus, wise dismissals significantly improve
performance relative to unwise non-dismissals.
With regard to unwise dismissals, Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the number of
points per match significantly improves by 0.41. However, wise non-dismissals similarly
improve team performance by 0.43 points per match. Indeed, the F-test for equality of
these parameters cannot be rejected (F = 0.04). This result suggests that the improvement
14 We also replicated the approach of van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) by pooling all dismissals into one treatment group and
all non-dismissals into one control group. Like van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we fail to find any significant performance
difference between the treatment group and the control group for both the restricted and the unrestricted matching
procedures. Thus, the results of van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) are nested within our approach.
15 Dismissal observations consist of 9×34 team-matches from the German Bundesliga and 32×38 team-matches from the
other leagues. Non-dismissal observations consist of 9×34 team-matches from the German Bundesliga and 27×38 team-




restricted team matching unrestricted team matching
Points Win Goal diff Points Win Goal diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wise dismissal 0.23*** 0.10*** 0.18 0.23*** 0.08*** 0.26***
(0.080) (0.030) (0.146) (0.042) (0.015) (0.065)
Unwise non-dismissal -0.10 -0.02 -0.17 0.05 0.02 -0.09
(0.095) (0.038) (0.111) (0.052) (0.021) (0.076)
Unwise dismissal 0.41*** 0.14*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.15*** 0.46***
(0.055) (0.026) (0.089) (0.040) (0.016) (0.058)
Wise non-dismissal 0.43*** 0.15*** 0.57*** 0.36*** 0.13*** 0.45***
(0.078) (0.026) (0.109) (0.053) (0.019) (0.080)
Home 0.42*** 0.15*** 0.68*** 0.46*** 0.14*** 0.72***
(0.045) (0.015) (0.060) (0.023) (0.008) (0.033)
Rank opponent 0.05*** 0.016*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.014*** 0.08***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Team-season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 overall 9.06% 7.77% 11.22% 8.54% 6.56% 11.24%
N 2,854 2,854 2,854 8,280 8,280 8,280
F-test β1 = β2 7.30*** 5.69** 3.49* 7.27*** 5.69** 12.37***
F-test β3 = β4 0.04 0.04 0.85 1.67 0.94 0.01
Notes: The table reports the coefficients estimated using team-season fixed effects regression models. The cutoff for wise
and unwise (non-)dismissals is at equal ranks in the xG table and in the OLT. Columns (1) to (3) show the results for
restricted team matching, and Columns (4) to (6) show the results for unrestricted team matching. Standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
in points per match after unwise dismissals would also have occurred if the coach had not
been dismissed. The F-tests in Columns (2) and (3) confirm the finding that unwise
dismissals do not improve performance relative to the relevant control group of wise non-
dismissals.
For the unrestricted team matching procedure, in which all 143 actual dismissals
are matched to a non-dismissal, the number of observations is 8,280, consisting of 5,326
matches from dismissal teams and 2,954 matches from non-dismissal teams.16 Columns
(4) to (6) show that the results remain similar. Specifically, the F-tests for equality show
that the performance effect of wise dismissals is significantly larger than the performance
effect of wise non-dismissals, but that there is no performance gain from unwise dismissals
over wise non-dismissals.
16 Again, several non-dismissal team-seasons serve as controls for multiple actual dismissals.
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Note that unwise non-dismissals do not have a positive effect on subsequent perfor-
mance in any of the specifications in Table 3. This result is expected if these teams
indeed performed poorly on the pitch in the absence of bad luck and the coach was not re-
placed. Thus, the categorization into unwise non-dismissals using expected goals appears
to successfully filter out the random component that usually leads to mean reversion in
performance.
Overall, our main results support Hypothesis 1 that wise dismissals improve perfor-
mance relative to an unwise non-dismissal control group with similarly poor performance
on the pitch. Moreover, the positive performance effects observed for unwise dismissals
appear to be driven solely by mean reversion, thus supporting Hypothesis 2.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
The categorization into wise and unwise dismissals is crucial in our analysis. Even though
the cutoff at equal OLT and xG table ranks is straightforward, several sensitivity tests
are required to evaluate the robustness of our results. In particular, we do not know the
details of the circumstances that triggered each decision to dismiss a coach. For example,
conflicts with key players would be expected to translate into lower performance on the
pitch in future matches. Thus, we might have labeled some dismissals as unwise even if
the decision to dismiss the coach was justified.
We address this concern by testing alternative rank differences in favor of wise (non-
)dismissals. First, we categorize a dismissal as wise even if the ranking based on xG is one
spot higher than the OLT rank: only if the ranking based on xG is more than one spot
higher do we categorize a dismissal as unwise. Analogously, we categorize a non-dismissal
as unwise if the ranking based on xG is more than one spot lower than the ranking based
on the OLT, and we categorize it as wise otherwise. Column (1) of Table 4 shows the
results for the restricted team matching procedure using points as the dependent variable.
Again, the F-tests reveal that wise dismissals significantly increase the number of points
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obtained in a match compared to unwise non-dismissals, whereas unwise dismissals do not




restricted team matching unrestricted team matching
–1/+1 –2/+2 –3/+3 –1/+1 –2/+2 –3/+3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wise dismissal 0.16** 0.18** 0.15 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.27***
(0.072) (0.077) (0.129) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039)
Unwise non-dismissal -0.09 -0.07 -0.13 0.02 -0.06 -0.09
(0.105) (0.085) (0.129) (0.050) (0.056) (0.075)
Unwise dismissal 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.47***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.044) (0.049) (0.051)
Wise non-dismissal 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.33***
(0.084) (0.081) (0.085) (0.062) (0.075) (0.084)
Home 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.46***
(0.048) (0.053) (0.063) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
Rank opponent 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Team-season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 overall 8.66% 8.76% 8.55% 8.42% 8.29% 8.03%
N 2,444 2,012 1,328 7,870 7,160 5,812
F-test β1 = β2 3.93* 5.00** 2.37 11.73*** 23.59*** 18.65***
F-test β3 = β4 0.71 1.02 0.91 4.53** 2.65 1.82
Notes: The table reports the coefficients estimated using team-season fixed effects regression models based on varying rank
difference cutoffs for wise and unwise (non)-dismissals. Columns (1) to (3) show the results for restricted team matching,
and Columns (4) to (6) show the results for unrestricted team matching. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Next, we extend the rank difference in favor of wise (non-)dismissals to -2 and -3 for
wise dismissals and to +2 and +3 for wise non-dismissals. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4
show that the results remain robust to the -2/+2 cutoff. However, the difference between
the performance effects of wise dismissals and unwise non-dismissals is not statistically
significant for the -3/+3 cutoff (p-value = 0.13).17
Analogously, we assess the sensitivity of our results to varying cutoffs for the unre-
stricted team matching procedure. As shown in Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4, wise dis-
missals improve performance relative to unwise non-dismissals in all specifications, while
17 Because Hypothesis 1 states that the performance effect of wise dismissals is larger than the performance effect of unwise
non-dismissals, one could argue that a one-tailed F-test might also be feasible. In this case, the difference is significant
at the 10% level.
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unwise dismissals do not improve performance relative to wise non-dismissals in all but
one specification.18 Overall, the sensitivity analysis shows that our main findings broadly
hold when using different cutoffs to categorize wise and unwise (non-)dismissals.19
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the effect of head coach dismissals on performance critically depends
on whether football club boards falsely attribute bad luck to low coach ability or whether
performance was indeed poor when deciding to replace the coach. We find that dismissals
after poor performance on the pitch increase subsequent team performance compared to
the control group, while dismissals after bad luck do not.
Our study has important implications for the design of future studies that investi-
gate the relation between coach dismissal and subsequent team performance. Depending
on the importance of the luck and board misperception components in a certain sport,
the average coach effect might be biased towards zero. Thus, without accounting for
the misperceptions of boards in their coach dismissal decisions, the results might be mis-
leading. Moreover, the findings have direct implications for football clubs. On the one
hand, dismissing a head coach is expensive. First, the dismissed coaches receive indemnity
payments for the instantaneous cancellation of the contract (Muehlheusser et al., 2016).
Second, the dismissal of a head coach usually involves the departure of his backroom sup-
port staff. For example, assistant coach Giuseppe Carillo also departed US Palermo in
18 Additionally, we run the complete sensitivity analysis with Win and Goal diff as dependent performance variables. The
results remain unchanged except for the models using the goal difference in the restricted team matching procedure.
While the coefficients of wise dismissals are still larger than the coefficients of unwise non-dismissals, the equality of the
coefficients cannot be rejected.
19 Furthermore, one might worry that the departure of assistant coaches disrupts the coaching staff and leads to declining
performance even though the head coach remains in their post. In our analysis, such a mechanism could systematically
lower the performance of teams in the unwise non-dismissal control group and explain why teams perform significantly
better after wise dismissals than after unwise non-dismissals. To address this concern, we checked whether the assistant
coaches of teams in the matched unwise non-dismissal control group left while the head coach remained. In all but one
case, the assistant coaches also remained in their posts. The only exception is Steve Agnew who left Hull City during the
2014/15 season to become assistant coach at FC Middlesbrough. Our results remain robust to the exclusion of Hull City’s
2014/15 season; thus, we are confident that the results are not driven by the departure of assistant coaches. Additionally,
Peeters, Szymanski, and Terviö (2017) provide empirical evidence that clubs tend to rehire experienced managers even
though a considerable fraction of those managers are of lower ability than novice head coaches. This preference to rehire
experienced head coaches further complicates the promotion of assistant coaches to head coach positions.
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the 2015/16 season and Udinese Calcio in the 2016/17 season when head coach Giuseppe
Iachini was dismissed. Finally, there are recruiting costs associated with finding a new
coach. Thus, instead of spending this money on unwise dismissals, it could be invested
in the recruitment of better players. On the other hand, as wise dismissals do improve
team performance, the money associated with such dismissals is likely to be well spent.
Consequently, it is of critical importance for club boards to correctly assess the drivers
that led to performance below expectations when considering the dismissal of a coach.
In this regard, more analytical approaches, such as the use of expected goals, could help
to reduce the number of ineffective dismissal decisions. Furthermore, football clubs could
employ analytical approaches to justify their decisions to fans and the media, which might
reduce the pressure on boards to dismiss coaches unnecessarily.
Certainly, our study has limitations. Most importantly, it is likely that the ranking
based on expected goals is not perfectly accurate. While we include team-season and
opposing team-season fixed effects to approximate team strength in our expected goals
model, we cannot rule out that other factors not included in the model, such as defensive
pressure or individual player skills, bias our xG estimates. However, as we compare the
same teams to each other in the restricted team matching method, this bias should be
present in both the dismissal groups and in the non-dismissal groups. Nevertheless, future
studies should investigate more sophisticated or further analytical approaches to filter out
the random component of team performance more rigorously.
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A Appendix
Table A.1 defines the variables used and shows the descriptive statistics for the 214,194
shots taken in the 9,130 matches in our sample.
Table A.1
Descriptive statistics for shots.
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Goal Shot resulting in a goal (0/1) 0.112 0.316 0 1
Location
Distance Distance between the shot location and the midpoint
between the two goalposts measured in meters
18.60 7.44 0.60 91.10
Angle Angle between the shot location and the two goalpost
measured in degrees
22.95 12.74 0.10 173.60
Rule setting
Open play Shot is taken during open play (0/1) 0.938 0.241 0 1
Free kick Shot is taken as a free kick (0/1) 0.050 0.217 0 1
Penalty kick Shot is taken as a penalty kick (0/1) 0.012 0.110 0 1
Body part
Foot Shot is taken with the foot (0/1) 0.842 0.365 0 1
Header Shot is taken with the head or another body part (0/1) 0.158 0.365 0 1
Notes: The number of observation is 214,194.
Building on Brechot and Flepp (2020), we employ a logistic regression analysis and
estimate the model as outlined in Equation A.1:
Ln
[
P (Goalijkl = 1)
P (Goalijkl = 0)
]
= β1 Distanceijkl +β2 Angleijkl +β3 Free kickijkl
+ β4 Penalty kickijkl +β5 Header ijkl +θjl + τkl + εijkl
(A.1)
where i denotes the shot, j and k indicate the team and the opposing team, respectively,
and l refers to the season. θjl and τkl refer to team-season and opposing team-season fixed
effects, respectively.
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Table A.2 shows the parameter estimates for Equation A.1.
Table A.2












Team-season fixed effects Yes
Opposing team-season fixed effects Yes
Pseudo R2 0.204
N 214,194
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